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Casenotes
THE SUPREME COURT TURNS ITS BACK ON THE
FIRST AMENDMENT, THE 1992 CABLE ACT AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT: TURNER BROADCASTING
SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC
Free speech is a fundamental right protected by the First
Amendment.1 This guarantee is subject to only a few, narrow ex-
ceptions.2 Consequently, to avoid the presumption of invalidity,
regulations that restrict speech are subject to exacting levels of
scrutiny.3
Presently, the cable television industry is subject to speech re-
strictions in the form of "must-carry" provisions.4 In 1992, Congress
enacted the latest must-carry regulations in the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (Cable Act). 5
The Cable Act contains provisions requiring cable system operators
to carry the signals of certain broadcast stations.6 In response to
the promulgation of the Cable Act, Turner Broadcasting Systems,
Inc. filed suit against the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) and the United States in the United States District Court for
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
. .Id .
2. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994). For a full
discussion of relevant exceptions, see infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing regulation of newspapers), and notes 75-78 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing regulation of broadcast television).
3. Different levels of scrutiny are applied to different categories of speech.
For a full discussion of the different First Amendment standards, see infra notes 23,
28-29 and accompanying text (discussing the intermediate level of scrutiny), notes
71-74 and accompanying text (discussing the most restrictive level of scrutiny) and
notes 75-80 and accompanying text (discussing the least restrictive level of
scrutiny).
4. "Must-carry" provisions require cable system operators to carry the signals
of a specified number of local broadcast television stations. Turner Broadcasting,
114 S. Ct. at 2453.
5. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47
U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1991) [hereinafter Cable Act]. Congress promulgated the
Cable Act after three years of hearings. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819
F. Supp. 32, 39 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated and remanded 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994). For a
full discussion of the congressional hearings, see infra notes 43, 52-53 and accom-
panying text.
6. 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-535 (Supp. 1993). For the pertinent text and legislative
history of these provisions, see infra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
(295)
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the District of Columbia, alleging that the must-carry provisions vio-
lated the First Amendment.7
This Note will analyze the Supreme Court's holding and rea-
soning in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC and the implica-
tions it holds for the cable television industry concerning First
Amendment protection. The first section of this Note will be an
introduction to the background of this area of law, concentrating
on the history of cable television as well as earlier must-carry provi-
sions. The background will be followed by a discussion of the facts
of the Turner Broadcasting case along with the lower court's treat-
ment of the case. The third section of this" Note will analyze the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Turner Broadcasting, focusing on
those arguments that led the Court to its holding. Finally, this Note
will discuss the potential impact of Turner Broadcasting on future
issues concerning the cable television industry and the First
Amendment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of Cable Television
During the four and a half decades of its existence, the cable
television industry has expanded from a reception tool into a video
marketplace in direct competition with broadcast television. 8 Origi-
nally, cable television was developed to enhance the reception of
broadcast television 9 in rural areas.' 0 With developments in tech-
nology however, cable television has expanded into an independ-
ent source of television programming and now, due to its
advantages over broadcast television, is in direct competition with
broadcast television." A wide variety of programming and clear re-
7. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2455.
8. See Gary S. Lutzker, The 1992 Cable Act and the First Amendment: What Must,
Must Not, and May Be Carried, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENrr. L.J. 467, 468-77 (1994)
(discussing history of Cable Act).
9. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1437 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(defining "broadcast television" as conventional commercial or public television
transmitted over air waves to a viewer's television set). Broadcasting transmission
travels from one broadcaster to a large number of viewers. Note, The Message in the
Medium: The First Amendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARv. L. REv.
1062, 1063 (1994).
10. Lutzker, supra note 8, at 478. When cable television was first developed in
1948, it was known as "Community Antenna Television" (CATV). Kathy L. Cooper,
The Cable Industry Revisited in the Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992, 1 Comm. L. CONSPECTUS 109, 110 (1993). In his discussion of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Lutzker traces the
history of regulation of the cable industry. Lutzker, supra note 8, at 468-77.
11. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2451.
[Vol. III: p. 295
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ception are two advantages cable television has over broadcast
television. 
12
Regulation of cable television is controlled by the FCC, which
was established by Congress in 1934 to regulate broadcasters and
common carriers of wire and radio signals.' 3 At the outset of cable
television, the FCC declined to exercise jurisdiction over the indus-
try, maintaining that its jurisdiction did not extend to cable system
operators14 and cable system programmers 15 because they were not
"common carriers" or "broadcasters." 16 Due to continued pressures
from broadcasters, who argued that cable television was an eco-
nomic threat to broadcast television and that the FCC was charged
with the economic regulation of broadcast television, the agency
began to regulate the cable industry in the mid-1960s. 17 The FCC's
current authority over the cable industry, however, is limited to ac-
12. Id. at 2452. Cable television offers networks, such as CNN. MTV, ESPN.
Id. These networks and many others are available only through a cable system. Id.
In 1992, 90% of the homes in the country had access to cable service and over 60%
of those homes subscribed to the service. S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 at
1135 (1992), reprinted in, U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1134 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 92]. See
also Michael D. Gaffney, Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC: Judicial Deregulation of Cable
Television Via the First Amendment, 20 SuFFoLK U. L. REv. 1179 (1986). When cable
television was first developed, most cable systems could only offer a few stations,
but with advancements in technology, the channel capacity increased. Id. Today,
cable systems can carry over one hundred stations. Id.
13. Gaffney, supra note 12, at 1181. The Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) was created by Congress in the Communications Act of 1934. Id. Con-
gress established the administrative agency to regulate the airwaves and to "serve
the public interest in broadcasting." Id. at 1181 n.15 (citing M. HAMBURG, ALL
ABour CABLE 5-1, 5-12 (1981)). The agency was given the responsibility of creat-
ing a worldwide wire and radio communication system through the regulation of
rates and services of common carriers and broadcasters of communication signals.
Id. at 1181 n.15 (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610 (1986 & Supp. 1994)).
14. Cable system operators are the entities who own the cable networks and
transmit the cable signal to the viewer. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2452.
15. Cable system programmers produce television programs and sell or li-
cense them to cable operators. Id.
16. Gaffney, supra note 12, at 1182. The FCC is only charged with the regula-
tion of "common carriers" and "broadcasters." Id. In the late 1950s, however,
broadcasters argued that the FCC had the authority to regulate cable because it
was a threat to the financial survival of broadcast television. Id. A measure was
introduced in the Senate for a congressional clarification of the scope of FCC's
authority to include cable operators. Id. This measure was never passed. Id. at
1183.
17. Gaffney, supra note 12, at 1183. The FCCjustified its authority over cable
operators by reasoning that cable transmitters utilized microwave transmission fa-
cilities, and, because microwave transmitters were common carriers within the ju-
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tions that are "reasonably ancillary" to its regulation of broadcast
television.1 8
B. Must-Carry Provisions
The FCC began its regulation of the cable industry by imple-
menting the first must-carry provisions in 1965.19 The provisions
required cable television operators to transmit every local over-the-
air broadcast station upon request, without compensation. 20 The
must-carry provisions were modified when it was codified in the
1984 Act.21 The constitutionality of the 1984 must-carry provisions
was challenged under the First Amendment in Quincy Cable TV, Inc.
v. FCC.2
2
The Quincy court subjected the must-carry provisions to the in-
termediate level of scrutiny test for First Amendment challenges de-
veloped by the Supreme Court in United States v. O'Brien.23 The
18. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). Southwest-
ern Cable Co. (Southwestern) transmitted broadcasting signals from Los Angeles
stations into the San Diego area. Id. at 160. A San Diego broadcaster argued that
Southwestern's transmission was adverse to public interest and petitioned for an
order limiting respondent's transmission. Id. The FCC granted the petition. Id.
Southwestern challenged the order on the grounds that the FCC lacked the au-
thority to grant such an order. Id. at 161. The Supreme Court held that the FCC
acted within the authority granted them under the Cable Communications Act of
1934. Id. at 181.
19. Cooper, supra note 10. The original must-carry rules were imposed on
microwave cable systems. Id. at 110, 111. Within one year, however, the must-carry
provisions were imposed on all cable television systems. Id. at 111.
20. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.57-76.61 (1984) cited in Quincy, 768 F.2d 1434, 1437.
Whether a station qualified as "local" was determined by the agency's rules. Id. at
1437. See generally Cooper, supra note 10, at 110 n.18. See also, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610
(1988) (codifying Communications Act of 1934) [hereinafter 1984 Act].
21. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993). Between 1965 and 1984,
uncertainty over the cable industry caused the regulations to undergo many modi-
fications. See Cooper, supra note 10, at 109-13 (tracing the history of cable
regulation).
The 1984 Act, however, did not retain the requirement that cable systems
carry all local stations upon request and without compensation. Cooper, supra
note 10, at 113. After the 1984 Cable Act, cable systems could not be required to
set aside more than 15% of their channel capacity for commercial broadcast use.
Id. at 113 n.60 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 612 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993)).
22. 765 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The Quincy court consolidated two cases
for purposes of reviewing the constitutionality of the must-carry provisions. Id. at
1438. Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc., sought review of the FCC's denial to
delete the must-carry regulations from the 1984 Act. Id. at 1437. Quincy Cable
Television, Inc. sought review of an FCC order requiring the system to carry cer-
tain local broadcast stations. Id. Petitioners argued that the regulations violated
their First Amendment rights by compelling and depriving speech. Id. at 1438.
The FCC relied on the rationale that the must-carry provisions were imperative to
the survival of local broadcast television. Id. at 1439.
23. 391 U.S. 367 (1967). In protest of the Vietnam War, O'Brien burned his
draft notice in a demonstration to persuade others against the war. Id. at 369.
[Vol. III: p. 295
4
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol3/iss1/8
1996] SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRsT AMENDMENT 299
D.C. Circuit determined that the must-carry provisions abridged
cable operators' and programmers' First Amendment rights.2 4
While the Quincy court held that the cable industry was protected
by the First Amendment, it declined to define the scope of such
protection, enabling it to find the provisions unconstitutional with-
out determining the appropriate level of scrutiny.2 5 The court ex-
pressed hesitation in applying the O'Brien test in the context of
cable television but reasoned that, since the regulations did not
pass intermediate scrutiny, there was no need to subject them to a
heightened level of scrutiny.26 Moreover, the court held that must-
carry provisions are not per se unconstitutional, providing Congress
with the incentive to formulate new provisions.2 7
The O'Brien test, as applied in Quincy, states that expressive
conduct 28 may be regulated if: (1) the regulation is within the con-
stitutional power of the government; (2) the regulation furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) if the inci-
dental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 29
O'Brien was convicted for violating a federal statute prohibiting the destruction of
draft notices. Id. O'Brien argued that his protest was a form of free speech under
the First Amendment and that the statute violated his rights. Id. at 370. The
Supreme Court held that the statute did not violate the First Amendment. Id. The
Court set forth a four prong test to be applied when deciding whether or not a
governmental regulation is sufficientlyjustified. Id. at 377. For a full discussion of
the O'Brien test and its application, see infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
24. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1448-63.
25. Id. at 1448. The court was hesitant about adopting a standard of scrutiny
for cable television because the issue had not been addressed by the Supreme
Court. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1462.
28. Expressive conduct is conduct that contains both speech and non-speech
elements. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1967). A long line of Supreme Court cases
have held that expressive conduct receives the same First Amendment protection
as pure speech. See, e.g., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853
(1982) (holding local school boards may not remove books from school library
simply because they disagree with ideas contained in those books); Healy v. James,
408 U.S. 169 (1972) (holding that state university's refusal to recognize organiza-
tion because of disagreements with that organization's philosophies was violation
of First Amendment); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (holding
that public sidewalk adjacent to school grounds may not be declared off limits for
expressive activity, such as picketing); Tinker v. DesMoines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (holding prohibition on arm-bands worn in protest of war violates students'
First Amendment rights).
29. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1454-62. See also O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (origin of test
applied in Quincy).
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The third prong of the OTrien test, requiring content-neutral-
ity, acts as a threshold requirement for the application of the re-
maining prongs.30 A regulation may be either content-based on its
face 31 or content-based as applied.32 Moreover, the Supreme Court
has found that regulations that are "speaker partial" are content-
based.33
Once content-neutrality is established, the government must
then satisfy the second and fourth prongs of the O'Brien test.3 4 The
second prong requires the government to show that an important
governmental interest is being furthered by the regulation. 35 If
30. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 375. Content-neutral regulations are unrelated to
the content of the regulated speech. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781
(1989) (regulations attempting to control speech content are "content-based" and
subject to highest level of scrutiny).
31. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 795. In Ward, the Supreme Court developed a test to
determine if a regulation is content-based on its face. Id. at 797-800. The Ward
test turns on the government's purpose in adopting the regulation. Id. In Ward,
Rock Against Racism (RAR) violated a New York City ordinance proscribing the
noise levels for organizations using Central Park. Id. at 784. After violating New
York City's noise ordinance, RAR's subsequent request to use Central Park was
denied on the basis of the violations. Id. at 785. RAR argued that the guidelines
were an invalid restraint on freedom of speech. Id. at 788. The Supreme Court
held that the ordinance was valid because it was content-neutral and passed the
O'Brien test. Id. at 803. The Court stated that "the principle inquiry in determin-
ing content neutrality, in speech cases in particular, is whether the government has
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it con-
veys." Id. at 791.
32. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990). A regulation that is
content-neutral on its face may still be content-based. Id. at 315. Eichman was
convicted of violating a federal statute prohibiting mutilation of the United States
flag. Id. at 312. He burned several flags in protest of various government policies.
Id. The Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional. Id. The Court found
that due to Congress' attempt to suppress free expression, it was content-based and
failed to meet strict scrutiny requirements. Id. at 315, 318. Specifically, the Court
found that prohibiting the mutilation of the flag does not further the govern-
ment's interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of the nation. Id. at 316. The
Court reasoned that "[a] Ithough the Flag Protection Act contains no explicit con-
tent-based limitation on the scope of the prohibited conduct, it is nevertheless
clear that the Government's interest is 'related to the suppression of free expres-
sion,' and concerned with the content of such expression." Id. at 315 (quoting
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410 (1989)).
33. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19-23 (1976). Speaker-partial regulations
are those that favor one set of speakers over another because of the legislature's
agreement with the favored speakers' speech. Id. These regulations have been
found to be content-based and demand strict scrutiny. Id.
34. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing content-neutrality as
threshold O'Brien requirement).
35. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1967). The O'Brien Court determined that
there was a substantial governmental interest in preventing the destruction of draft
cards. Id. at 380. In reaching its conclusion, the Court examined the purposes of
Selective Service certificates (draft notices) and determined that destruction of the
notice would defeat many of those purposes. Id. at 378. The purposes included
proof that the individual has registered for the draft, information regarding to
6
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demonstrated, the government then carries the additional burden
of showing that the restriction on speech is an "appropriately nar-
row" means of furthering the interest - the fourth prong.3 6
The must-carry provisions at issue in Quincy were struck down
for their failure to meet the requirements of the O'Brien test.3 7 Spe-
cifically, the court held that the Government failed to meet its bur-
den of showing an important government interest, because there
was no proof that cable was a threat to broadcasting.3 8 In the alter-
native, the D.C. Circuit found the regulations were overbroad, thus
failing the fourth prong as well.3 9 Although the Quincy court ex-
pressed "serious doubts" over the appropriateness of applying the
O'Brien test, it reasoned that because the provisions failed under
this intermediate level of scrutiny, it was not necessary to determine
whether a stricter level of scrutiny was required.40 In its holding,
the court concluded that must-carry provisions were not per se un-
constitutional, leaving the door open for future must-carry
provisions. 41
Following Quincy, Congress attempted to reformulate must-
carry provisions consistent with the First Amendment.42 In Novem-
whom the individual would address questions, reminders to the individual and
prevention of the use of the certificates for deceptive purposes. Id. at 379-80.
36. Id. at 337, 382. The OBrien Court held that the federal statute also met
the least restrictive requirements of the fourth prong. Id. at 381. The Court deter-
mined that making destruction of a draft card illegal was the only means available
to ensure that the notices would remain intact. Id. The Court did not discuss
whether or not the chosen means were required to be the least restrictive means
available. Later cases, however, held that under the O'Brien test, it was not re-
quired for the regulation to be the least restrictive means available. See Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989) (stating that state must avoid choos-
ing means that are "substantially broader" than necessary to further interest). See
also United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985) (holding that barring an indi-
vidual from military base by commanding officer for cause did not violate that
individual's First Amendment rights, even when individual could not re-enter for
an open house, because exclusion is not greater than is essential to furtherance of
government interest).
37. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
38. Id.
39. Id. Specifically, the court found the regulations overbroad because they
encompassed every broadcaster regardless of whether there was an adequate
amount of local broadcasting in an area. Id. at 1462.
40. Id. at 1448.
41. Id. at 1462. The significance of this conclusion is that the court was in-
forming the FCC and Congress that it would be willing to uphold must-carry provi-
sions if the provisions were tailored in a manner consistent with the First
Amendment. See id
42. S. REP. No. 92, supra note 12, at 1172. Rather than appealing the district
court's decision, the FCC attempted to refashion the must-carry rules. Id. at 1172.
The FCC began proceedings in November 1985 and five months later a decision
was reached between cable operators and broadcasters. Id. at 1172. The rules
1996]
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ber 1986, one year after the Quincy decision, the FCC promulgated
new, less demanding must-carry provisions. 43 Under the new provi-
sions cable operators were no longer required to carry every sta-
tion. 44 Moreover, as part of a newjustification, the FCC argued that
the provisions were only required for an interim period of five years
during which a new system consisting of both broadcast and cable
stations would be introduced to viewers. 45
The constitutionality of the new must-carry provisions was chal-
lenged in Century Communications Corp. v. FCC46 As in Quincy, the
Century court applied the O'Brien test and held that the provisions
violated the First Amendment because the Government failed to
demonstrate that the provisions furthered a substantial government
interest.47 Again, the court qualified its holding by stating that it
adopted by the FCC in November 1986, however, contained a new purpose and
new line of reasoning. Id. at 1172.
43. Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 295 (D.C. Cir.
1987). The 1986 provisions were less demanding than their 1934 counter-parts.
Id.
44. Id. at 297. First, a broadcast station had to qualify to be included in the
"must-carry pool" by demonstrating that it attained a certain percentage of viewing
hours in the community. Id. at 296-97 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 76.56 (1986); 47 C.F.R
§ 76.5(d) (1) (ii) (1986)). Also, cable systems did not have to carry more than one
station affiliated with the same commercial network. Id. at 297 (citing 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.56 (1986)). Systems with less than twenty channels did not have to carry any
broadcast stations. Id. at 297 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 76.56 (1986)). A system with
fewer than 54 channels had to carry one noncommercial station and a system with
54 or more stations was required to carry two stations. Id. at 297 (citing 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.56 (1986)).
45. Century, 835 F.2d at 296. A new device called an "input-selector device"
would be attached to the television and would enable a viewer to, by the flick of a
switch, choose between shows offered by the cable system and those programs of-
fered by the broadcast stations. Id. The FCC estimated that five years would be
ample time to introduce viewers to the device and allow them to become comforta-
ble with its use. Id. The result of the implementation of the device would be a
combined system that would allow the viewer to choose between broadcast and
cable television. Id.
46. Century, 835 F.2d 292. Century Communications Corporation, along with
13 other plaintiff groups, consisting of cable operators, presented three arguments
to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: (1) the
provisions violated the First Amendment freedom of speech; (2) they violated the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment by taking property without just com-
pensation; and (3) the FCC did not have the jurisdiction to promulgate such regu-
lations. Id. at 297.
47. Id. at 303. In finding that the FCC failed to meet the second prong of the
O'Brien test, the court reasoned that the FCC was making a broad assumption - i.e.,
that without must-carry provisions cable operators would not carry broadcast sta-
tions. Id. The court required direct evidence to support this assumption. Id. The
FCC, however, failed to provide it. Id. Additionally, the court declined to define
the scope of the cable industry's First Amendment protection because the
Supreme Court had not yet addressed the issue. Id. For a full discussion of the
O'Brien test, see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
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did not hold must-carry provisions per se unconstitutional; Con-
gress, again, attempted to formulate provisions that would hold up
against the First Amendment.48
C. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992
The FCC's third attempt at constitutional must-carry provisions
resulted in the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Compe-
tition Act of 1992 enacted on October 5, 1992. 49 During the three
years preceding promulgation of the Cable Act, Congress con-
ducted a fact-finding process to determine the state of the television
industry.50 Congress's principal finding was that the cable industry
had a powerful and growing market power.51 They concluded that
broadcast television was being jeopardized by the strength of the
cable industry and that governmental regulation was necessary to
48. Century, 835 F.2d at 304. By qualifying its holding, the Century court
demonstrated, as it had in Quincy, that it would be willing to uphold must-carry
provisions if the FCC was able to produce proof in support of its allegations that
the broadcast medium suffered at the hands of cable. Id. "[T]he government
must be able to adduce either empirical support or at least sound reasoning on
behalf of its measures. As in Quincy Cable TV, we reluctantly conclude that the FCC
has not done so in this case .... " Id. (emphasis supplied). See also S. REP. No. 92,
supra note 12.
49. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2452 (1994). The
Cable Act was enacted by Congress over a Presidential veto. Id.
50. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 39 (D.D.C.
1993). From 1989 to 1992, the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transpor-
tation conducted 11 separate hearings concerning the 1984 Cable Act. Id. The
1984 Cable Communications Policy Act contained the first Federal policy for cable
television. S. REP. No. 92, supra note 12. Congress was concerned with promoting
the growth of cable television and establishing a national cable policy. Cooper,
supra note 10, at 112 (1993). The must-carry provisions were struck down by the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Century Communications
Corp. v. FCC. For a full discussion of this case, see supra notes 43-48 and accompa-
nying text. In light of the 1984 Cable Act's demise, various hearings were held on
general issues concerning the video programming industry. S. REP. No. 92, supra
note 12, at 1136.
51. S. REP. No. 92, supra note 12, at 1135. The Committee determined that
the source of this power was derived from cable operators who enjoy a monopoly
over the local area they serve. Id. at 1141. The Committee recognized that alterna-
tive sources of programming would decrease the power of cable operators. Id. at
1144.
A further concern was that the industry had become "horizontally concen-
trated," meaning that many cable systems were commonly owned. Id. at 1165. A
1990 study showed that the five largest cable systems controlled half of the nation's
cable subscribers. Id. at 1165. The two major concerns with horizontal concentra-
tion are that: (1) information will be biased in favor of the views of the operators in
control and there will be no outlet for unpopular speech; and (2) the seller
(programmer) does not have the benefit of a competitive market. Id. at 1166.
19961
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protect the longstanding view that "television broadcasting plays a
vital role in serving the public interest."52
Congress attempted to harness the cable industry's power by
imposing various new burdens on both cable system operators and
cable system programmers. 53 The most controversial of these bur-
dens are the must-carry provisions. 54 The must-carry provisions reg-
ulate the speech of both operators and programmers. 55
Section four of the Cable Act requires cable operators to carry
the signals of local commercial television stations and qualified low
power stations.56 A cable system with twelve or fewer channels and
52. S. REP. No. 92, supra note 12, at 1174. The Committee accepted evidence
showing that cable systems had and would continue to use their market power to
refuse to carry local broadcast stations. Id. at 1175. They relied on a study per-
formed by the Mass Media Bureau to support its conclusion. Id. at 1175 n.102. See
"Cable Systems Broadcast Signal Carriage Survey," Staff Report by the Policy and
Rules Division, Mass Media Bureau, Sept. 1, 1988 (containing findings on cable
systems' voluntary carriage of local broadcast stations). Also, the Committee found
that those systems that granted carriage often repositioned the channels, making it
difficult for the audience to find the channel. Id. at 1177.
53. See 47 U.S.C. § 535 (Supp. 1993). Aside from the "must-carry" provisions,
the Cable Act subjects the cable industry to rate regulation by the FCC and by the
municipal franchising authorities; prohibits municipalities from awarding exclu-
sive franchises to cable operators; imposes various restrictions on cable program-
mers that are affiliated with cable operators; and directs the FCC to develop and
promulgate regulations imposing minimum technical standards for cable opera-
tors. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2453 (citing 47 U.S.C. title V-A). This note
will discuss only the "must-carry" provisions.
54. The must-carry provisions are contained in §§ 4 and 5 of the Cable Act.
47 U.S.C. §§ 534, 535 (Supp. 1993).
55. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2456. The must-carry provisions regulate
speech in two ways. Id. One way affects cable operators and the other affects cable
programmers. Id. First, in requiring an operator to carry a certain number of
stations, the law reduces the number of stations over which the operator has edito-
rial control, i.e. choosing what programs are aired. Id. Second, with less channels
available on cable systems, there are less channels to carry the programs of the
cable programmers, thus the programmers are forced to compete for the reduced
space. Id.
56. 47 U.S.C. § 534(a) (Supp. 1993).
"Local commercial television station" means any full power television
broadcast station, other than a qualified noncommercial educational tele-
vision station within the meaning of section 535(1)(1) of this title, li-
censed and operating on a channel regularly assigned to its community
by the Commission that, with respect to a particular system, is within the
same television market as the cable system.
Id. 8 534(h) (1) (A) (Supp. 1993).
'Qualified low power station' means any television broadcast station con-
forming to the rules established for Low Powered Television stations con-
tained in part 74 of title 47, Code of Federal Regulations, only if -
(A) such station broadcasts for at least the minimum number of
hours of operation required by the Commission for television broad-
cast stations under part 73 of title 47, Code of Federal Regulations;
(B) such station meets all obligations and requirements applicable to
television broadcast stations ...
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more than 300 subscribers are required to carry at least three local
commercial television stations.57 A system with more than twelve
channels is required to carry up to one-third of the local commer-
cial stations that request carriage.58 If more stations request car-
riage than a system is required to carry, the cable operator is left
with the discretion of determining which stations will be carried. 59
Further, stations must be carried in their entirety and on the same
channel position as when broadcast over the air, unless the cable
system and broadcaster come to an agreement.60
Section five of the Cable Act imposes similar requirements with
respect to qualified local noncommercial educational television sta-
tions and qualified noncommercial educational television sta-
tions. 61 A cable system with twelve or fewer channels must-carry
(C) such station complies with interference regulations ...
(D) such station is located no more than 35 miles from the cable
systems's headend, and delivers to the principal headend of the
cable system an over-the-air signal of good quality, as determined by
the Commission;
(E) the community of license of such station and the franchise area
of the cable system are both located outside of the largest 160 Met-
ropolitan Statistical Areas....
(F) there is no full power television broadcast station licensed to any
community within the country or other political subdivision (of a
State) served by the cable system.
Id. § 534(h) (2) (Supp. 1993).
Congress found that local broadcasting is "vital" because it provides the com-
munity with local news, public affairs and emergency broadcasts. S. REP. No. 92,
supra note 12, at 1175. Ensuring the carriage of this type of station furthers the
government's interest that local broadcast television remains viable and available
to viewers. 47 U.S.C. § 521(a) (8) (Supp. 1993). The Committee believed that
without regulation, cable operators would have no incentive to carry local stations
because by carrying a station, the cable system is increasing the potential advertis-
ing revenue for the broadcasting station and decreasing the operator's own
chances of earning that revenue. Id. § 521(a)(15). Furthermore, the Committee
reasoned that cable systems would also benefit from the must-carry provisions be-
cause consumers often subscribe to cable to obtain or improve local stations;
broadcast programming remains the most popular programming on cable systems.
Id. § 521(a) (17), (19).
57. 47 U.S.C. § 534(b) (1) (A) (Supp. 1993).
58. Id. § 534(a)(1)(B).
59. Id. § 534(b) (2).
60. S. REP. No. 92, supra note 12, at 1177. "Channel repositioning has a direct
and negative impact on the competitive viability of local broadcast stations .... "
Id. The Committee found that channel repositioning (1) made it difficult for the
audience to locate the channel and (2) not all channels are equal so stations posi-
tioned higher than 14 may not get through to some viewers. Id.
61. 47 U.S.C. § 535 (Supp. 1993). "Qualified noncommercial educational tel-
evision station" means:
[A] ny television broadcast station which - (A) (i) under the rules and reg-
ulations of the Commission in effect on March 29, 1990, is licensed by the
Commission as a noncommercial educational television broadcast station
and which is owned and operated by a public agency, nonprofit founda-
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one qualified local noncommercial television educational station. 62
A cable system with thirteen to thirty-six channels must-carry be-
tween one to three qualified stations.63 A cable system with more
than thirty-six channels must-carry all qualified stations that request
carriage. 64
D. Right of Access: First Amendment Protection and the Cable
Industry
The central issue surrounding First Amendment protection of
the cable television industry is whether the characteristics of cable
television are more like the print media or more like broadcast tele-
vision. 65 Determination of cable's likeness to one of these media
identifies which level of scrutiny should be applied to cable televi-
sion regulation. 66
Relying on an established First Amendment right of access to
"public forums," 67 speakers have argued that they also have First
tion, corporation, or association; and (ii) has as its licensee an entity
which is eligible to receive a community service grant, or any successor
grant thereto, from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, or any suc-
cessor organization thereto, on the basis of the formula set forth in sec-
tion 396(k) (6) (B) of this title; or (B) is owned and operated by a
municipality and transmits predominantly noncommercial programs for
educational purposes.
Id. § 535(1) (1) (A). "Qualified local noncommercial educational television station"
means:
[A] qualified noncommercial educational television station - (A) which is
licensed to a principle community whose reference point.... or any suc-
cessor regulations thereto, is within 50 miles of the principle headend of
the cable system; or (B) whose grade B service contour .... or any succes-
sor regulations thereto, encompasses the principle headend of the cable
system.
Id. § 535(1) (2).
"[P]ublic television provides educational and informational programming to
the nation's citizens .... " Id. § 521 (a). Congress found that public television
plays an integral role in serving the educational and informational needs of local
communities. Id. Furthermore, if access to public television is not ensured, those
people who support the stations will be deprived of the benefit. Id.
62. Id. § 535(b) (2).
63. Id. § 535(b) (3) (A).
64. Id. § 535.
65. Lutzker, supra note 8, at 467. Newspapers and broadcasters enjoy differ-
ent levels of First Amendment protection. Id. For a complete discussion of the
different levels of protection afforded to each medium, see infra notes 70-73 and
accompanying text (discussing highest level of scrutiny) and notes 74-77 and ac-
companying text (discussing lowest level of scrutiny).
66. Gaffney, supra note 12. Broadcast television regulations are subjected to a
low level of scrutiny, while the print media enjoys the highest level of First Amend-
ment protection. Id. at 1189.
67. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct.
2701 (1992).
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Amendment based rights to certain "private forums," specifically,
the media. The Supreme Court has, in certain limited circum-
stances, granted this right.68 However, as a consequence to this
right, when a speaker asserts his or her right to use a private forum
against the owner's will for expressive purposes, the owner's First
Amendment rights are also implicated.69
The Supreme Court has never recognized a First Amendment
based right of access to the print media.70 Newspaper editors enjoy
the highest level of First Amendment protection. 71 Consequently,
regulations that restrict the discretion of newspaper editors are sub-
ject to strict scrutiny.72 Strict scrutiny requires regulations that im-
pinge on an editor's discretion to be narrowly tailored to further a
substantial governmental interest. 73 In Miami Herald Publishing Co.
v. Tornillo, the Supreme Court struck down a Florida statute requir-
ing newspapers to allow political candidates the opportunity to re-
spond to criticism.
7 4
The broadcast media, on the other hand, has received differ-
ent treatment by the Supreme Court which has allowed the public
68. See Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (private shop-
ping center treated as public forum because "public in nature").
69. The First Amendment also carries with it a right not to speak. See Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co., v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986); Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705 (1977) (A state may not "require an individual to participate in the
dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on his private property in
a manner and for the express purpose that it be observed and read by the
public.").
70. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
71. See id. at 248.
72. Id. at 258.
73. Id.
74. Id. The statute in question in Tomillo required newspapers to give polit-
ical candidates an opportunity to reply to criticism. Id. at 243. Miami Herald
printed criticisms of Tornillo. Id. Tornillo relied on the Florida "Right to Reply"
statute and demanded that the newspaper allow him equal space to rebut the criti-
cisms. Id. at 245. Miami Herald argued that the statute violated the First Amend-
ment because it attempted to control the newspaper's content. Id. at 275.
Tornillo, in turn, argued that the government had an obligation to ensure diversity
of viewpoints. Id. at 248. The Court struck down the statute because it was an
"intrusion into the function of editors." Id. at 258. The Tornillo Court reasoned
that the "choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to
the limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues
and public officials - whether fair or unfair - constitute the exercise of editorial
control and judgment." Id. at 258. The Court recognized that the economic
growth of the newspaper industry made access to the press almost impossible and
that minimal governmental action may be required to enforce a right of access. Id.
at 251, 254. The action must be tailored in a manner that does not impinge on
editorial control andjudgrnent. Id. at 258. See also NewYork Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964) (standing for proposition that debate on public issues should
be "uninhibited, robust and wide-open").
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certain rights of access to the airwaves.7 5 Relying on a "scarcity ra-
tionale,"76 the Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC held that
access regulations of broadcast television were required for the
preservation of "an uninhibited marketplace of ideas, in which
truth will ultimately prevail .... -77 Consequently, regulation of the
broadcast media is subjected to the least amount of First Amend-
ment scrutiny.78
The cable industry is also entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion.79 In Leathers v. Medlock, the Supreme Court held that cable
programmers and operators are entitled to First Amendment pro-
tection because they transmit speech.80 The Court reasoned that
because cable provides news, information and entertainment, it was
engaged in speech and received protection from the First Amend-
ment.8' The Court, however, did not define the scope of this pro-
tection until Turner Broadcasting.82
75. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See also CBS, Inc.
v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (upholding statute granting "limited right to reason-
able access").
76. Because scarcity of resources is unique to broadcasting, it is set apart from
other media and commands that the government regulate the airwaves. See FCC v.
League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (spectrum scarcity in broad-
cast demands special consideration); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 376 (scarcity of re-
sources demands lower level of scrutiny).
77. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S.
1, 20 (1945); New York Times & Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). In Red Lion, a
radio station owned by Red Lion Broadcasting violated the "fairness doctrine"
which required radio and television broadcasters to allow proponents of both sides
of an issue equal time by refusing to allow air-time to an author whose book had
been criticized over the air. Id. at 371-72. The station argued that the statute vio-
lated its First Amendment rights. Id. at 370-71. The Supreme Court upheld the
statute by relying on the scarcity rationale when determining the appropriate re-
view of broadcast regulation. Id. at 376. The Court reasoned that broadcast fre-
quencies are a limited resource and, therefore, a low level of scrutiny should be
applied to regulations with this purpose. Id. at 376, 386.
78. Id. at 390.
79. See infra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's po-
sition that cable operators are entitled to First Amendment protection).
80. 499 U.S. 439 (1990). In Leathers, cable operators, cable programmers and
cable subscribers brought a class action suit challenging an Arkansas sales tax on
cable television services. Id. at 442. The cable operators and subscribers argued
that their activities were protected by the First Amendment. Id. The Court, how-
ever, found that the tax did not abridge those rights because it was neither specifi-
cally directed at cable television nor was it content based. Id. at 447, 449.
81. Id. at 444.
82. See Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994). Until Turner Broadcasting,
the Supreme Court had never defined the scope of First Amendment protection of
cable.
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II. FACTS
On October 5, 1992, Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. filed
suit against the United States and the FCC in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the must-carry
provisions in sections four and five of the Cable Act.83 Turner ar-
gued that the must-carry provisions, on their face, violated its First
Amendment right to freedom of speech and that the regulations
should be subjected to a strict scrutiny test, similar to the test devel-
oped in Tornillo.84 Plaintiffs asserted that the must-carry require-
ments impinged on the cable programmers' "editorial discretion"
to decide which programs to carry and which not to carry.8 5 More-
over, plaintiffs argued that the regulations were content-based and
demanded strict scrutiny.86
83. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 37 (D.D.C.
1993). Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. is the owner of several cable program-
ming operations. Id. Turner Broadcasting filed suit on the same day that the
Cable Act was signed into law. Id. Four other plaintiff groups consisting of cable
operators and programmers, brought similar suits. Id. The groups included Dan-
iels Cablevision Inc., Time Warner Entertainment Co., National Cable Television
Association and Discovery Communications, Inc. Id. at 37 n.8. Turner Broadcast-
ing amended its brief to include the other plaintiffs and the court consolidated the
five groups into one. Id. at 37 n.7.
Initially, plaintiffs asserted First Amendment challenges to the "retransmission
provisions" contained in section six of the Cable Act. Id. at 36. The retransmission
provision prohibits cable operators from carrying a station without first obtaining
the broadcaster's consent. Id. at 37. Under the provision broadcasters negotiate
carriage agreements with cable operators. Id. The court restricted its analysis,
however, to the challenges made against sections four and five of the Cable Act.
Id. at 38. No determination was made concerning the constitutionality of section
six because the basis of plaintiffs' argument was that section six was not severable
from section four and if section four was struck down, then section six would fol-
low. Id. The court, however, found section four to be constitutional and declined
to address the severability issue. Id. at 32 n.10.
84. Id. at 39. Strict scrutiny is the standard applied to regulations that attempt
to control newspapers. For a full discussion of Tornillo and the development of the
strict scrutiny standard, see supra note 60 and accompanying text. See also Sable
Communications v. FCC, 429 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co. v. Minnesota Comm'n of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983).
85. Turner Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. at 38. The regulations in Tornillo were
found to be unconstitutional because they interfered with the editorial control and
judgment of the newspaper. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241 (1974).
86. Turner Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. at 39. Plaintiffs argued that the govern-
ment was favoring one set of speakers (broadcasters) over another (cable opera-
tors). Id. at 42. In some instances, regulations that favor one set of speakers over
another are content-based and demand strict scrutiny. Id. See also Buckley v. Valeo
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (noting that speaker partial regulations based on content of
favored speaker's speech demand strict scrutiny). Regulations that favor a set of
speakers because of the message conveyed by those speakers are content-based.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-23. Turner argued that the government's purpose behind
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In opposition to Turner's argument for strict scrutiny, the FCC
presented congressional findings to the court to sustain the FCC's
promulgation of the must-carry provisions.8 7 In support of their ar-
gument for the least restrictive scrutiny test, the test applied in Red
Lion, the Government argued that the regulations are content-neu-
tral and impose only an incidental burden on speech.88
The court dismissed each of Turner's arguments and held that
the regulations were valid based on the O'Briena-Ward formula.89
The court relied on congressional findings that the broadcast me-
dium was in serious danger of eradication and regulation was a nec-
essary savior.90 The court did not view the must-carry provisions in
a regulatory manner.91 Rather, it distinguished the provisions as
economic regulations "designed to create a competitive balance in
enactment of the regulations, to preserve local broadcasting, was content-based.
Turner Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. at 43.
87. Turner Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. at 46. Congress conducted a series of
hearings before enacting the Cable Act. See S. REP. No. 92, supra note 12. In sup-
port of the regulations, the FCC relied heavily on Congress' finding that the eco-
nomic strength of the cable industry was harming broadcast television. Turner
Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. at 39. For a discussion of the relevant hearings and
findings, see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
88. Turner Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. at 39. The government relied on United
States v. O'Brien and Ward v. Rock Against Racism to support its argument that con-
tent-neutral regulations that impose an incidental burden on speech should be
subjected to an interest balancing test. Id. at 44-45. This has become known as the
O'Brier-Ward formula. For a full discussion of the balancing analysis applied in
United States v. O'Brien and Ward v. Rock Against Racism, see supra notes 31 & 35-36
and accompanying text.
89. Turner Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. 47, 51. The court applied a standard
composed of the O'Brien and the Ward tests. Id. at 45. The court dismissed the
plaintiffs' content-based argument on the grounds that the provisions are at most
marginally "content related" and do not raise a First Amendment concern. Id. at
44.
The dissent took the view that the regulations were content-based. Turner
Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. at 58 (Williams,J., dissenting). Judge Williams looked to
the legislative history of the Cable Act, which characterized local broadcasting as
"an important source of local news and public affairs programming and other local
broadcast services critical to an informed electorate," and concluded that the regu-
lations were content-based. Id. at 58 (Williams, J., dissenting) (citing 1992 Act,
§ 2(A) (11)). Judge Williams went on to analyze the must-carry provisions under
the strict scrutiny test applied to content-based regulations. Id. at 59 (Williams, J.,
dissenting). He determined that the fit between the interest and the regulations
was too weak to survive strict scrutiny standards. Id. at 61 (Williams, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, he found that even if there was a substantial interest, less restrictive
alternatives were available. Id. at 63 (Williams, J., dissenting).
90. Turner Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. at 46, relying on S. REP. No. 92, supra note
12. The court reasoned that Congress is afforded great deference regarding their
fact-finding abilities. Turner Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. at 46.
91. Turner Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. at 40.
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the video industry as a whole .... "92 The court found the promo-
tion of fair competition in the video industry to be a significant
government interest.93
In applying the fourth prong of the O'Brien test, which requires
that the regulation be "appropriately narrow," the court held that
the Government did not have the burden of showing that it chose
the least restrictive means available to satisfy its interests, only that
the regulations were narrowly tailored.94 The court, again, de-
ferred to congressional findings and held that the regulations were
narrowly tailored.95
Following the district court's decision, Turner appealed di-
rectly to the Supreme Court.96 The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari and held that the appropriate level of First Amendment
scrutiny for the must-carry provisions is the O'Brien-Ward intermedi-
ate standard. 97 The Court determined, however, that there were
unanswered questions of fact and remanded the case to the district
court for further fact-finding. 98
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Narrative Analysis
1. The Majority Opinion
The scope of First Amendment protection afforded to cable
television was an issue of first impression before the Supreme Court
in Turner Broadcasting.99 Arguing in favor of a minimal amount of
protection, the Govemment offered three arguments which fo-
92. Id. The court viewed the must-carry provisions as economic regulations
designed to promote competition in the video industry. Id. at 40. The cable indus-
try's monopoly over the video industry was detrimental to broadcasting and Con-
gress, by enacting the Cable Act, was exercising its regulatory powers over the
economy. Id. The court termed the regulations as "industry specific antitrust and
fair trade practice regulatory legislation" and found that the First Amendment was
only involved because "video signals have no other function than to convey infor-
mation." Id.
93. Id. at 45. The finding of a substantial governmental interest satisfies the
first prong of the O'Brien test. For a discussion of the four-prong O'Brien test, see
supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
94. Turner Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. at 47.
95. Id. at 47. The court recognized that alternatives did exist but held that
the government was not required to adopt a less efficient alternative simply be-
cause it was less restrictive. Id. at 47, relying on Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781 (1989).
96. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
97. Id. For a discussion of the O'Brien-Ward test, see supra note 89.
98. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2472.
99. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2445.
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cused on cable's likeness to broadcast television. 100 At the other
end of the spectrum, however, appellants argued that cable, like
the print media, deserved the highest level of First Amendment
protection.10 1 The Turner Broadcasting Court found that cable
shared characteristics of both the print media and the broadcast
media.10 2 Consequently, there is a limited First Amendment-based
right of access to cable television; the right of access is determined
by applying the O'Brien-Ward intermediate standard of scrutiny
test. 10 3 The case, however, was remanded for further fact-finding to
determine whether cable is in fact a threat to the survival of broad-
cast television. 10 4
Relying upon its holding in Leathers v. Medlock, 105 the Court be-
gan its analysis by acknowledging that cable is entitled to First
Amendment protection. 10 6 The Court then went on to distinguish
cable television from broadcast television in its dismissal of the Gov-
ernment's arguments in favor of the least restrictive level of
scrutiny. 107
The Government's first argument was that the similarities be-
tween broadcast television and cable television mandate that the
two media be subjected to the same level of scrutiny.108 The Turner
Court held that the "scarcity rationale" used by the Red Lion
Court' 09 was not applicable to cable television because the scarcity
100. Id. at 2456. The Government argued three points: (1) cable and broad-
cast are similar in character; (2) cable and broadcast both suffer from a "market
dysfunction;" and (3) the must-carry provisions are merely economic legislation.
Id.
101. Id. at 2464. The highest level of First Amendment protection is strict
scrutiny. Id. at 2455, 2466. For a discussion of strict scrutiny, see supra notes 70-73
and accompanying text.
102. Id. at 2469.
103. Id. at 2469. The O'Brien-Ward test is an intermediate level of scrutiny test
applied to content-neutral regulations which have an incidental effect on speech.
Id. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (establishing test for
content-neutrality); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (establishing
intermediate scrutiny test).
104. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2469.
105. 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
106. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2456. The Leathers Court reasoned that
because cable programmers and operators provide news and information, they are
engaged in speech. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1990). See also Los
Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986) (holding that re-
spondent denied cable franchise by city had First Amendment right to hearing).
107. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2456.
108. Id. at 2456. There is no discussion in the opinion of the specific similari-
ties relied on by the Government.
109. Id. at 2456. The Red Lion holding was based on a "scarcity rationale." Id.
at 2457. The physical structure of broadcast television creates a scarcity of broad-
cast frequencies which limits the amount of speakers who can gain access to the
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of resources that plagues the broadcast medium is not present in
the cable medium. 110
The Government's second argument for application of the Red
Lion standard was that the "market dysfunction" characteristic of
both cable and broadcast brings them under the same First Amend-
ment protection."' The Court dismissed this argument on two
grounds. First, the Court reiterated that the physical, not the eco-
nomic characteristics, of broadcast television is the basis for the
Court's broadcast jurisprudence.' 1 2 Second, the Government of-
fered no proof in support of the assertion that cable television suf-
fers from a market dysfunction.' 3
A third argument advanced by the Government urged the use
of a rational basis test.114 The Government rested its argument on
the assertion that the must-carry provisions were no more than "in-
dustry-specific" antitrust legislation." 5 The Court refused to apply
a standard for general laws and stated that laws that single out the
press are subject to "heightened First Amendment scrutiny.""16
airwaves. Id. Therefore, more leniency is given to broadcast regulations than to
other regulations. Id. For a full discussion of Red Lion and the "scarcity rationale"
theory, see supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. See also FCC v. League of
Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (holding that ban on editorials violated First
Amendment as there is public interest in presenting various viewpoints).
110. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2456. The cable medium does not suf-
fer from the same structural impediments that the broadcast medium suffers from.
Id. at 2457. Technological advances could make it possible to have an unlimited
number of speakers using the cable medium. Id. See also Gaffney, supra note 11
(discussing expansion of the cable medium).
111. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2457. The government, however, ac-
knowledged the technological differences between cable and broadcast but as-
serted that the economic characteristics of the media are similar. Id.
112. Id. The scarcity rationale is based on the physical structure of the broad-
cast industry. Id. at 2456.
113. Id. The court stated that "the mere assertion of a dysfunction ... in a
speech market, without more is not sufficient to shield a regulation from First
Amendment standards applicable to nonbroadcast media." Id. at 2458 (citing Aus-
tin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657-58 (1990); Federal Elec-
tion Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 256-59 (1986);
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248-58 (1974)).
114. Id. The "rational basis" test is the lowest standard of scrutiny in First
Amendment claims and is applied to economic regulations. The test requires sim-
ply that there be a rational relationship between the regulation and its purpose.
See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
115. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2458. The government maintained that
Supreme Court precedent dictates that regulations whose purpose is to correct
market dysfunction in a market whose commodity is speech, are subjected to a
rational basis test. Id. The Court found that the government's reliance on the
market dysfunction theory was misplaced because the cases cited in appellee's
brief involved straight antitrust issues and not First Amendment issues. Id.
116. Id. (citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Rev-
enue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983)). Laws of general application are laws that are not
1996]
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After dismissing the Government's least restrictive scrutiny ar-
guments, the Court decided that the must-carry provisions are con-
tent-neutral.11 7 The Court reasoned that, although cable operators
are compelled to carry stations they may otherwise not choose to
carry, demand of carriage is not dependant on the content of a
particular cable operator's programming.11 8 Relying on precedent,
the Court asserted that facially content-neutral regulations may still
be content-based if the purpose of the regulation is to control the
message being conveyed by the regulated speech.' 9 Accepting the
congressional reports as evidence of the purpose behind the regula-
tions, the Court held that there was no attempt by the Government
to control the content of cable programming. 20
The Court next considered and dismissed Turner's three argu-
ments in favor of application of the Tornillo strict scrutiny test.121
applied differently to different sets of persons. Id. The must-carry provisions are
not laws of general application because they single out the press. Id. Traditionally,
laws that single out the press have been subject to a heightened level of scrutiny.
Id. (citing Arkansas Writers Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987)).
117. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2460. Content-neutrality is a prerequi-
site for application of the O'Brien test. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1967). Content-based restrictions, however, are subject to a higher level of scru-
tiny. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2459.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg and Thomas, dissented
from the majority's view that the provisions are content-neutral. Id. at 2476
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). O'Connor based her opinion on the congressional
findings cited throughout the Cable Act that focus on the valued importance of
local broadcast television. Id. at 2476 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Specifically, in
the operative sections of the Cable Act, the FCC, when determining if a station
qualifies for carriage, must "afford particular attention to the value of localism by
taking into account such factors as... whether any other [eligible station] pro-
vides news coverage of issues of concern to such community or provides carriage of
sporting or other events of interest to the community." Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C.
§ 534(h) (1) (C) (ii) (Supp. 1993)).
118. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2460. The must-carry obligations apply
to all cable operators regardless of the content of the stations offered by the cable
operator. Id. The only determination made is according to channel capacity. Id.
The same reasoning was applied to the reduction of channels argument. Id.
119. Id. at 2461 (citing United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Clark
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984)). See also Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
120. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2462. The Court recognized that the
purpose of the regulations was to prevent cable television from having complete
economic control over broadcast television and to allow viewers access to free tele-
vision. Id. Justice O'Connor's dissent relied on the same legislative findings but
concluded that the Government was attempting to regulate the content of cable
programming by requiring operators to carry local and educational programs. Id.
at 2476-77 (O'Connor, J, dissenting). "The interest in ensuring access to a multi-
plicity of diverse and antagonistic sources of information, no matter how praise-
worthy, is directly tied to the content of what the speakers will likely say." Id. at
2477.
121. Id. at 2464.
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Turner's first argument was that the must-carry regulations intrude
upon the cable operators' "editorial discretion" by requiring opera-
tors to carry programs not of their own choosing. 122 Moreover,
Turner argued that viewers would instinctively accept the view-
points of the programs as the viewpoints of the cable operator.
123
This argument was based on the Supreme Court's decisions in
Tornillo and Pacific Gas, both of which held that speech regulations
that impinge on editorial discretion must be narrowly tailored to
further a substantial governmental interest.124
The Court identified three flaws in Turner's reliance on
Tornillo and Pacific Gas.125 First, the cases Turner relied on con-
tained content-based regulations, setting them apart from the con-
tent-neutral must-carry provisions.' 26 Second, the Court
determined that Turner's concern that viewers would accept the
views of the broadcast stations as those of the cable operator or
programmer was unfounded due to regulations requiring local
broadcast stations to periodically identify themselves.1 27 Finally, the
Court noted that the structure of newspaper distribution and availa-
bility is different from cable because readers are more likely and
better able to have access to various publications in the same area,





124. Id. at 2464, relying on Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241 (1974). The Tornillo Court held that regulations that intrude upon editorial
discretion are either per se invalid or must meet the highest level of scrutiny.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258. This level of scrutiny requires that the chosen restriction
be the least restrictive means available to further a substantial government interest.
Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2464. For a complete discussion of Tornillo, see
supra note 59 and accompanying text. Appellants also relied on a similar holding
in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 21 (1974). Turner
Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2465. In Pacific Gas, the Court applied strict scrutiny to a
statute that allowed a newsletter critical of the gas company to be mailed with each
bill to the consumer. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 20-21. The Court held the gas com-
pany's First Amendment right includes the right not to speak and by requiring
them to include the newsletter compromised this right. Id.
125. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2465-66.
126. Id. at 2465. In both Tornillo and Pacific Gas, the statutes at issue afforded
benefits to the speaker based on viewpoint. Id.
127. Id. Federal regulations require that broadcast stations identify them-
selves every hour. Id. at 2465-66 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 73.1201 (1993)).
128. Id. at 2466. Cable operators have more control over access than newspa-
per editors. Id. A newspaper is unable to prevent readers from purchasing and
reading other publications. Id. In contrast, cable operators with a local monopoly
have "gatekeeper" control over the television programming that enters a subscrib-
ers home and can use this control to "silence the voice of competing speakers with
a mere flick of the switch." Id. In the print media, the availability of various publi-
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Turner's second argument was that the must-carry provisions
are speaker-partial regulations and require strict scrutiny.' 29 Rely-
ing on Buckley v. Valeo, Turner reasoned that the must-carry regula-
tions favor broadcast programmers over cable programmers,
making them speaker-partial.130 The Court rejected appellant's in-
terpretation of Buckley, because strict scrutiny is only required for
speaker-partial regulations when the law is also content-based.1 3 1
Speaker-partial laws are content-based if they "reflect the Govern-
ment's preference of what the favored speaker has to say (or aver-
sion to what the disfavored speaker has to say)."132
Turner's final argument in favor of strict scrutiny was that the
must-carry regulations single out cable operators for disfavored
treatment.133 In dismissing this final argument, the Court relied on
Leathers v. Medlock which held that a law that singles out a certain
medium does not heighten First Amendment scrutiny unless it is
"constitutionally suspect."'T 4 Furthermore, even in cases where
there may be a need for heightened scrutiny, such scrutiny may be
unwarranted if there are "special characteristics" of the medium
that require differential treatment. 3 5 The Court found that cable
operators' bottleneck monopoly was a "special characteristic,"
catons allow a reader to have exposure to many different viewpoints and issues.
Id. The existence of one cable company subjects the viewer to the views espoused
by that particular operator, without the ability to look elsewhere. Id.
129. Id. at 2466. In support of its argument, Turner relied on Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Id. Turner interpreted Buckley to require all speaker-
partial regulations to be subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 2466.
130. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2466.
131. Id. at 2466-67. The regulation at issue in Buckley was invalid because it
concerned the "communicative impact" of the speech. Id. at 2467.
132. Id. (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 548
(1983)).
133. Id. at 2467. Turner argued that the type of burdens imposed on cable
has not been imposed on analogous video delivery systems. Id. In support of this
argument, appellants offered a line of cases that invalidated discriminatory taxa-
tion of the press. Id. (citing Arkansas Writers Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221
(1987); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575 (1983); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936)).
134. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2468 (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499
U.S. 439 (1991)). Leathers held that laws that single out a certain medium are
"constitutionality suspect only in certain circumstances." Id. at 2468 (quoting
Leathers, 499 U.S. at 444). There was no further discussion of what factors are
necessary for a regulation to be constitutionally suspect.
135. Id. at 2468 (citing Arkansas Writers Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221
(1987); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575 (1983)).
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therefore the must-carry provisions escaped strict scrutiny.13 6 More-
over, the Court found that the must-carry regulations are aimed at
the entire cable industry rather than a select few operators or
programmers.13 7
In part three of its opinion, the Court discusses the adoption
and application of the O'Brien-Ward intermediate level of scrutiny
test.138 The Government's first burden under the test was to show
that the economic health of local broadcasting was in jeopardy and
in need of the type of relief offered by must-carry provisions.13 9
The Government failed to meet their burden because it was unable
to show that the problem they sought to remedy actually existed.140
The Government relied on congressional findings and main-
tained that even when predictive, legislative findings must be af-
forded great deference. 141 The Court responded, however, that
while congressional findings do deserve a certain level of defer-
ence, they do not preclude judicial review. 142 It is the Court's duty
136. Id. at 2468. No argument was made that other forms of media are af-
flicted with the problem of a bottleneck monopoly. Id. On these grounds, the
Court justified differential treatment of cable. Id.
137. Id. 114 S. Ct. at 2468 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1) (1993)). The only
cable systems exempt from must-carry are those with fewer than 300 subscribers.
47 U.S.C. § 534(b) (1) (Supp. 1993). The Court held that the structure of the
must-carry provisions did not pose a threat to First Amendment interests. Turner
Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2468.
138. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2469. The Court agreed with the dis-
trict court that the intermediate level of scrutiny was the appropriate standard for
the must-carry provisions because the must-carry provisions are content-neutral
regulations and impose only an incidental burden on speech. Id.
139. See id. 114 S. Ct. at 2470; United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
The Turner Court referred to the House and Senate reports to find the purpose
behind the Cable Act and found that Congress believed that the must-carry provi-
sions served three governmental interests: "(1) preserving the benefits of free,
over-the-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting the widespread dissemina-
tion of information from a variety of resources, and (3) promoting fair competi-
tion in the market for television programming." Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at
2469. The Court viewed these interests in the abstract and recognized them as
important and substantial. Id.
140. Id. at 2470. Precedent required factual support for assertions that a gov-
ernmental interest existed. Id. (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993);
Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986); Home Box
Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
141. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. 2470-71. See also CBS, Inc. v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (noting that deference is given to legislative find-
ings in First Amendment cases); FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting,
436 U.S. 775 (1978) (holding that, in some instances, Congress better suited than
the court to answer specific complex questions).
142. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2471, relying on Sable Communications,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435
U.S. 829 (1978). Specifically, the Court held that "in First Amendment cases the
deference afforded to legislative findings does not foreclose our independent
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to determine whether or not factual findings are supported by sub-
stantial evidence.1 43 In First Amendment cases, the Court must ex-
ercise independent judgment and decide if Congress has "drawn
reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence." 144
The Government relied on a 1988 FCC study and concluded
that without must-carry regulations, a number of broadcast stations
would be denied carriage and would be unable to survive. 145 The
Court determined that the study was inconclusive because even if
both parties accepted the study as evidence, there was no direct
proof that the protected stations would suffer financially without
must-carry provisions. 46 The Court suggested that the Govern-
ment offer evidence showing that, as a result of being dropped, lo-
cal broadcast stations have fallen into bankruptcy, turned in their
broadcast licenses, curtailed their broadcast operations or suffered
a serious reduction in operating revenues.1 47
Significantly, the Court did not directly address the Govern-
ment's attempt to satisfy the fourth prong of the O'Brien test, which
requires a showing that the regulations be narrowly tailored to serve
their purpose.' 48 They did, however, state that direct evidence
would be required to satisfy this burden. 49
The Court remanded the case to the district court to give the
Government an opportunity to provide factual evidence in support
of its assertions that the broadcast medium is suffering at the hands
judgment to the facts bearing in an issue of constitutional law." Turner Broadcast-
ing, 114 S. Ct. at 2471 (internal quotes omitted).
143. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2471 (citing Century Communications
Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 304 (CA.D.C. 1987)).
144. Id. The Court, however, is not to review the evidence de novo. Id.
145. Id. at 2471. The report showed that during a period when must-carry
provisions were not in effect, 20% of cable systems dropped or refused carriage to
one or more local broadcasters. Cable System Broadcast Signal Carriage Survey, Staff
Report by the Policy and Rules Division, Mass Media Bureau, p.10, Table 2 (Sept. 1,
1988), cited in S. REP. No. 92, supra note 12, at 102-92.
146. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2471-72. The parties were in disagree-
ment over the significance of the statistics contained in the study. Id. at 2471.
147. Id. at 2472.
148. For a discussion of the four-prong O'Brien test, see supra notes 33-34 and
accompanying text.
149. Id. The Court found that there was a lack of evidence showing that the
must-carry provisions would be effective. Id. Evidence showing the scope of inter-
ference with speech and also showing the existence of less restrictive means would
be required to satisfy the final prong of the O'Brien test. Id.
In his concurrence, however, Justice Stevens wrote that the Court should af-
ford great deference to the legislative findings. Id. at 2473 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). Moreover, he suggested that if proper deference were given to the findings,
further factual findings would be unnecessary to sustain the constitutionality of the
must-carry provisions. Id. at 2474-75.
[Vol. III: p. 295
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of cable's power and that the must-carry provisions are an appropri-
ate remedy to the problem. 150
2. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice O'Connor, writing for the dissent, focused on the ma-
jority's finding that the must-carry provisions are content-neutral. 51
Justice O'Connor reasoned that each of the justifications offered in
support of the must-carry provisions refers to content. 152 In partic-
ular, Justice O'Connor focused on the benefits afforded noncom-
mercial educational television stations; Justice O'Connor reminded
the majority that in addition to prohibiting the suppression of
speech, the First Amendment "generally prohibits the government
from excepting certain kinds of speech from regulation because it
thinks that the speech is especially valuable." 153 Moreover, Justice
O'Connor stated that the existence of content-neutral justifications
does not allow the Court to ignore the content-based
justifications. 154
In the alternative, Justice O'Connor stated that even if the reg-
ulations were in fact content-neutral, they would fail the O'Brien in-
termediate scrutiny test.155 Justice O'Connor determined that even
if the asserted interest in the preservation of free television was an
important interest, the regulations restrict more speech than was
necessary. 156
B. Critical Analysis
The Supreme Court's finding that the must-carry provisions of
the Cable Act are content-neutral ignored established precedent. 57
150. Id. at 2472. The opinion was broken down into the majority, two concur-
rences and one dissent. The three dissenters concurred in part and dissented in
part (dissenting in judgment). Id.
151. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2477 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
152. Id.
153. Id. (citing RA.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2545 (1992); Arkansas Writ-
ers Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231-32 (1987); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468
U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 514-15
(1981) (plurality); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466-68 (1980); Police Dep't v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (Black,
J., concurring)).
154. Id. at 2478.
155. Id. at 2479 (stating that regulations are too restrictive regarding speech).
156. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2479 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
157. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (regulation that is
content-neutral on face may be content-based as applied); Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (regulations attempting to control speech are con-
tent-based and demand strict scrutiny); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1975) (restrictions that impinge on editorial discretion must
1996]
25
Sands: The Supreme Court Turns Its Back on the First Amendment, the 1992
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
320 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JouRNAL [Vol. III: p. 295
The must-carry provisions are content-based because they are
speaker-partial rules that favor one set of speakers over another
based on viewpoint.158 Because the must-carry provisions seek to
serve First Amendment goals, however, they are not facially invalid;
rather, they must pass a strict scrutiny test.
The most exacting level of scrutiny is applied to content-based
regulations. 59 Furthermore, First Amendment protection applies
equally to regulations that compel speech.' 60 The must-carry provi-
sions are content-based regulations that compel speech.
The majority held that the must-carry provisions were content-
neutral on their face, based on the Ward test.161 The Ward Court
held that if a form of speech is regulated because of the govern-
ment's agreement or disagreement with the message it conveys,
then the regulation is content-based on its face. 162 The Turner
Broadcasting majority, however, reasoned that the must-carry provi-
sions are content-neutral because the regulated entities, cable oper-
ators, are regulated without regard to the content of the programs
they run and the broadcasters are benefitted without regard to
their type of programming. 163 This reasoning is flawed.
First, the type of programming protected by the must-carry
provisions is local commercial programming and public educa-
tional programming. 64 One of the main purposes in mandating
carriage of local and educational programming, as articulated in
the Congressional Report, was the substantive value of this type of
programming. 165 Under the Ward test, if the government regulates
be narrowly tailored); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (speaker-partial laws are
content-based).
158. See Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (regulations that favor one set of speakers over
another demand strict scrutiny).
159. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Vic-
tims Board, 502 U.S. 105 (1991); Ward 491 U.S. 781; Perry Ed. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1981).
160. Riley v. National Fed'n for the Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988). The
Riley Court formulated the "compelled speech" doctrine which states that the First
Amendment protection extends to compelled speech. For further discussion on
the compelled speech doctrine, including criticisms, see David W. Ogden, Is There
First Amendment "Right to Remain Silent"? The Supreme Court's Compelled Speech Doc-
trine, 40 FED. B. NEws &J. 368 (1993).
161. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2460-61 (1994).
For a discussion of the Ward test, see supra note 103 and accompanying text.
162. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
163. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2460.
164. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 534, 535 (Supp. 1993).
165. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2476 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor relied on the legislative intent found in the Cable Act to support her
holding that the must-carry provisions are content-based. Id. Throughout the leg-
islative reports Congress stresses the importance of preserving the viewpoints pro-
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speech because of agreement (or disagreement) with the message it
conveys, the regulation is content-based. 166
Second, after restating its holding in Buckley, the Court applied
the holding incorrectly. As the Court stated, Buckley only applies to
speaker-partial laws that are content-based. 167 The test is whether
the speaker-based laws "reflect the Government's preference for
the substance of what the favored speakers have to say... ,"168 The
must-carry provisions are speaker-partial because they favor one set
of speakers (local and educational broadcasters) over another
(cable operators and programmers); they are content-based be-
cause they reflect the Government's belief that local educational
broadcasting is invaluable. 169 Thus, a proper application of Buckley
would have resulted in finding that the must-carry provisions do
"reflect the Government's preference for the substance of what the
favored speakers have to say" and require application of strict
scrutiny. 170
Other content-neutral purposes will not save the must-carry
provisions from strict scrutiny. Admittedly, preservation of local
broadcasting was not the sole purpose behind the must-carry provi-
sions.1 71 Effectuating a more competitive video market was also a
major purpose behind the Cable Act.172 Clearly, economic regula-
tion of this type is content-neutral. The existence of content-neu-
tral purposes, however, does not lessen the "impropriety" of
content-based purposes.173
vided for by local broadcasting. Id. For a full discussion of the legislative intent
and history, see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
166. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
167. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2467.
168. Id. at 2467.
169. Id. at 2462.
170. Id. at 2467. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (holding
that speaker-partial laws that reflect the government's preference demand strict
scrutiny).
171. See e.g., Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2471 (discussing protection of
broadcast industry from financial harm); S. REP. No. 92, supra note 12 and accom-
panying text (discussing legislative intent behind Cable Act).
172. See S. REP. No. 92, supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing legis-
lative intent behind Cable Act).
173. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2478 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting). Justice
O'Connor, in dissent, relied on a line of cases that struck down statutes for being
content-based even though their primary purpose was content-neutral. See, e.g.,
Arkansas Writers Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (striking down con-
tent-based exemptions in general revenue measure); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S.
641 (1984) (striking down content-based exemptions in general anti-counterfeit-
ing statute); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (striking
down on content discrimination grounds general urban beautification ordinance).
1996]
27
Sands: The Supreme Court Turns Its Back on the First Amendment, the 1992
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
322 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
Content-based restrictions must be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.1 74 Therefore, under this level of scrutiny,
the government must show that the must-carry provisions: (1) fur-
ther a substantial government interest; and (2) are the least restric-
tive means available to further the interest.' 75
The asserted interest protected by section four of the Cable Act
is the preservation of localism.176 The first prong of the strict scru-
tiny test requires the interest to be substantial and compelling.1 77
In dissent, Justice O'Connor questioned whether the protection of
localism is anything greater than an important interest. 1 7 It is
more likely that the reasons behind section five of the Cable Act
would be viewed as a compelling government interest. Section five
requires carriage of educational programming. 179 The asserted
governmental interest of educating its citizenry has in the past been
found to be a compelling governmental interest. 180
Assuming arguendo, that both sections passed the first prong
of strict scrutiny analysis, the Government must then show that the
must-carry provisions are the least restrictive means available. 81
The effects of the must-carry provisions extend beyond local cable
programmers and operators. Various networks dedicated to partic-
ular types of educational information which are only available
through cable may suffer.1 8 2 The Cable Act provides no protection
for these stations. It is argued that content-based restrictions
should not be allowed to extend to other speech that is as valuable
as the speech being protected.183 It is unlikely that the means
adopted in the must-carry laws are the narrowest means available to
insure diversity of viewpoints in the cable medium.
174. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2459. See also Ward, 491 U.S. 781;
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367.
175. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). For a
full discussion of the most restrictive standard of scrutiny test, see supra note 59
and accompanying text.
176. 47 U.S.C. § 532(a)(10) (Supp. 1993).
177. See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256.
178. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2478 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor recognized that the interest is important but stated that it is not compel-
ling. Id.
179. 47 U.S.C. § 535 (Supp. 1993).
180. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2476, 2478 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
relying on 47 U.S.C. § 532(a) (8) (A) (Supp. 1993).
181. See Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241.
182. Networks such as CNN, C-Span and the Discovery Channel, for example,
have their basis in educating the viewer. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2479
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). A decrease in channel availability resulting from the
carriage rules could have adverse effects on these types of networks. Id.
183. Id.
[Vol. III: p. 295
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Both Justice O'Connor and Judge Williams agree that the gov-
ernment may have a viable concern in the abstract.18 4 To this end,
both offered constitutional solutions. Justice O'Connor suggested
that the government consider subsidizing broadcasters who provide
programming deemed to be valuable.18 5 Justice O'Connor also
looked to technological solutions such as creating new forms of me-
dia in the form of satellite broadcasting or fiber optic networks with
unlimited channels. 186 Judge Williams suggested that the govern-
ment look no further than section nine of the Cable Act, where
leased access is presently employed as a speech-neutral solution. 18 7
In its urgency to dismantle long-standing First Amendment prece-
dent, the Supreme Court overlooked the possibility of alternative
solutions.
IV. IMPACT
Regardless of the district court's holding concerning the con-
stitutionality of the present must-carry provisions, the damage has
been done. The Supreme Court's determination that the must-
carry provisions are subject to intermediate scrutiny has the poten-
tial to chill speech in areas of communication that have not yet fully
developed.
Since its inception, a central goal of the First Amendment has
been to maximize access to diverse sources of information and min-
imize government regulation of speech.188 The Turner decision is
contrary to this goal. New sources of information are being devel-
oped daily. It is essential in this Age of Information that these new
sources are allowed to develop and expand to their full potential.
Pervasive regulation, such as the must-carry provisions, will prevent
this from being achieved. In fact, those Senators who opposed the
Cable Act warned that such measures of regulation would hinder
efforts to expand information technologies. 8 9
184. See id. at 2480 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Turner Broadcasting, 819 F.
Supp. 32, 62-63 (D.D.C. 1993) (Williams,J., dissenting).
185. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2480 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
186. Id.
187. Turner Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. at 66 (Williams, J., dissenting).
188. Jerry Berman and Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control: Re-
newing the Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media, 104YALE LJ. 1619 (1995).
189. See S. REP. No. 92, supra note 12, at 1227. "We are deeply concerned that
the net, albeit unintended, effect of many of S. 12's provisions - including rate
regulation and program access - would be to curtail greater investment in in-
creased channel capacity, new technologies, and programming." Id. at 1230.
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Turnerwas the Supreme Court's first opportunity to determine
what position cable television, a relatively new source of informa-
tion, occupies in First Amendmentjurisprudence. It was an oppor-
tunity for the Court to open the door to new technologies by
allowing these technologies full First Amendment protection. The
Court, however, declined this invitation. The Turner decision indi-
cates that the Court struggled with the determination. In fact, the
Court pushed and pulled on established First Amendment models -
e.g., Tornillo, Red Lion and O'Brien, in order to find a place for
cable.1 90 Unfortunately, the Court took the wrong approach.
Holli K Sands
190. One commentator has argued that Turner in fact created a new model.
See Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE Lj. 1757 (1995).
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